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NEW MEXICO RESTRAINT OF TRADE STATUTESA LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
JAMES J. WECHSLER*

The economic burden of many antitrust violations is borne in
large measure by the consumer in the form of higher prices for his
goods and services. This is especially true of such common and widespread practices as price-fixing, which usually result in higher prices
for the consumer, regardless of the level in the chain of distribution
at which the violation occurs .... Moreover, antitrust violations
almost always contribute to inflation. They introduce illegal and
artificial forces into the market place, thus undermining our
economic system of free enterprise.1
As a consequence of the substantial increase in consumer prices

and continued inflation of the 1970's,2 there has been a renewed
interest on the part of Congress and state legislatures to improve
enforcement of antitrust violations. This interest has resulted in
improved antitrust laws and increased budgets for federal and state
enforcement efforts. Congressional action has led to stronger penalties on the federal level for antitrust violators. Violators are now
subject to felony charges which carry a maximum jail term of three
years and a $100,000 fine for individuals and a fine of $100,000,000
for corporations. 3 Congress has also expanded the investigative tools
of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.4
Recognizing that the "State attorney genera! is an effective and
ideal spokesman for the public in antitrust cases," ' Congress has set
the stage for expanded state enforcement of antitrust violations.
Amendments to the Clayton Act 6 permit state attorneys general to
recover damages on behalf of natural persons residing in their state
*Assistant Attorney General, Director, Antitrust Unit, State of New Mexico; Member of
the Bar, States of New Mexico, Massachusetts, and New York; J.D. New York University.
1. H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 reprintedin [19761 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 2573.
2. See statement of President Ford, September 30, 1976, on signing the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
3. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
4. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § § 1311-1314
(1976).
5. H.R. Rep. No. 94-499, supra note 1, at 5, reprintedin [19761 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 2575.
6. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § § 1 to 26, 38 Stat. 730-40 (1914), (current version at 15
U.S.C. § § 12 to 14, 19 to 22, 27 (1976) and 29 U.S.C. § § 52-53 (1976)).
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for antitrust violations.' Congress has also authorized federal funding
for state antitrust enforcement. 8 In fiscal year 1978, the first year of
the availability of the funding, $10,787,337 was distributed to states
by the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. 9
The state legislatures have been equally active. Since 1970,
eighteen states have passed antitrust laws either modernizing previous

statutes or enacting new laws.'

0

To finance state enforcement

efforts, the legislatures of thirty states had budgeted funds specifically for state antitrust enforcement efforts during the mid1970's.' '
The New Mexico law originally enacted in 189 1, however, remains
substantially unchanged and has not proven to be an effective
enforcement tool. It is anticipated that legislation will be introduced
in the 1979 legislative session to permit meaningful efforts, by both
the State and private litigants, to combat anti-competitive practices.
The need for and the advantages of this legislation will be the focus
of this article.
THE NEED FOR STATE ANTITRUST LAWS
Federal antitrust law has not removed the need for the states to
have similar laws or to engage in active enforcement of antitrust
violations. The Sherman Act' 2 was designed "to supplement the
1
enforcement ... by the courts of the several States,"'"
and is
limited to activity which is in or affects interstate commerce. There
is, further, a distinct area of intrastate commerce in which federal
jurisdiction is lacking. The Supreme Court has refused to find a
conspiracy among local taxicab owners' 4 or an allocation of terri7. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
8. Crime Control Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976).
9. BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 830, Sept. 15, 1977 at D-3.
10. [19741 4 Trade Reg. Rep. . 30, 101 to 40, 506. Arizona (1974); Connecticut
(1971); Iowa (1976); Maine (1977); Maryland (1972); Massachusetts (1978); Minnesota
(1971); Missouri (1974); Nebraska (1974); Nevada (1975); New Hampshire (1973); New
Jersey (1970); Oregon (1975); South Dakota (1977); Virginia (1974); Washington (1972);
and West Virginia (1978). California has passed significant amendments pertaining to antitrust provisions, raising maximum fines to $1,000,000 for a corporation and to $100,000
for an individual, and providing for possible imprisonment of up to three years (1975). In
addition, Puerto Rico (1973) and the Virgin Islands (1973) have passed antitrust legislation.
11. National Associations of Attorneys General, Antitrust Manual
1.61 (1976). In a
survey conducted by the National Association of Attorneys General for fiscal year 1977-78,
of thirty-six states reporting on state funding, twenty-four indicated the receipt of state
funds for antitrust enforcement. 5 National Association of Attorneys General Antitrust
Bulletin 17 (July 14, 1978).
12. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1 to 8, 26 Stat. 209-10 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C.

§ § 1 to 7 (1976)).
13. 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
14. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
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tories by doctor-sponsored medical plans' I to be within the reach of
the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit, in addition, has held that allegations of antitrust violations in the practice of healing arts,' 6 the
distribution of bread,' I the business of practicing medicine' 8 and
furnishing medical services,' 9 as well as the activities of city real
estate boards 2 0 may be wholly within intrastate commerce, immune
from Sherman Act attack, and subject only to antitrust actions under
state law. Although in earlier cases there was a clear distinction made
between the jurisdiction of the state courts for intrastate violations
and that of the federal courts for interstate violations, the present
thought is that there is a substantial area of concurrent jurisdiction.
This idea of concurrent jurisdiction permits state jurisdiction over
activity which "affects" or is "in" interstate commerce, but which
retains a local impact.2
Strong state antitrust laws and enforcement are required because
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, even
when jurisdiction is available to them, do not have the resources to
pursue many of the violations brought to their attention.2 2 John H.
Shenefield, Assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, has remarked:
The Antitrust Division and the Bureau of Competition of the
Federal Trade Commission, together simply do not have the re15. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
16. Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. for Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir.
1952).
17. Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953). In holding that
alleged discriminatory prices did not violate the Robinson-Patman Price Discriminatory Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1975), the tenth circuit held that sales made in the course of interstate
commerce must be the means of the elimination of the local competition for the act to
apply. 208 F.2d at 780. See also Moore v. Mead Serv. Co. 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950).
18. Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944).
19. Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir.
1975).
62,078; Income
20. Bryan v. Stillwater Bd. of Realtors, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62.079.
Realty & Mortgage, Inc. v. Denver Bd. of Realtors, 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
21. Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. Fla. L. Rev. 653, 670 (1974).
A discussion of the boundaries of federal-state jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this
article. For a thorough discussion of that topic, see J. Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust
Regulation (1964); Rubin, supra; and Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust
Regulation, 61 Col. L. Rev. 1469 (1961). For an up-to-date codification see Fellmuth and
Papageorge, A Treatise on State Antitrust Law and Enforcement: With Models and Forms,
BNA Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 892, Dec. 7, 1978 (Supp. No. 1). With respect to
enforcement of restraints of trade within the area of concurrent jurisdiction, the U.S.
Department of Justice has taken the position that the states may be better equipped to treat
restraints which affect or are in interstate commerce, but which have primarily local impact.
U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Handbook, Federal-State Conference on Antitrust
Problems 1-2 (1969).
22. Javits, The Role of State Antitrust Laws, 1956 N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n. Antitrust Symposium 56.
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sources to investigate and prosecute all of the violations that experience leads us to believe are occurring. We are forced to make
decisions on utilization of our own scarce resources; is it, in effect,

better to attack a huge violation that costs each of 220 million
Americans a few cents or dollars each, or a smaller, local conspiracy
that costs a comparative handful of people each a great deal more?
The answer is evident, for if we do not prosecute the larger cases
there is no one else who really can. The smaller cases-smaller but no
less significant to their victims-require the2attention and diligence
that state enforcement authorities can bring. 3
As a result, cases with local impact are referred by the U.S. Depart2
ment of Justice to state enforcement authorities. 4
Many of the potential violations in New Mexico are of the local
nature described by Mr. Shenefield. These violations are not only
beyond the practical limitations of federal authorities, but may be
beyond the reach of interstate commerce. The reach of interstate
commerce in New Mexico with its small, isolated communities which
are, by the absence of adequate public transportation, as close to
self-sufficient as can be found in modern society, may be more
limited than in an industrial state. Yet it is for the same reasons that
anti-competitive activity can develop and be maintained so easily.
Effective state laws are necessary in order to stop this activity.
NEW MEXICO RESTRAINT OF TRADE STATUTES

In 1891, one year after the Sherman Act was signed into law, the
legislature of the Territory of New Mexico enacted antitrust legislation,2 s which, with the exception of minor amendments in 190726
and 1923,2'7 remains the present law. Substantively, this legislation2 8 parallels in many respects Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act 2 9 although the penalty provisions are far less severe.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal....30
23. Testimony of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, to the House Appropriations Comm. of the Vermont State
Legislature, March 2, 1978.
24. Id.
25. 1891 N.M. Laws, ch. 10, § § 1 to 3.
26. 1907 N.M. Laws, ch. 18, § 1.
27. 1923 N.M. Laws, ch. 37, § 1.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 57-1-1 to 4 (1978).
29. 15 U.S.C. § § 1, 2 (1976).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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The comparable New Mexico statute 3 l prohibits a contract or
combination, but not conspiracy as in the Sherman Act, which has
for its object to, or which operates to, restrict trade or commerce. A
violation of the state statute is a misdemeanor and is punishable by a
fine of $100 to $1,000 "and by imprisonment at hard labor not
exceeding one [1] year, or until such fine has been paid." 3 2 A
federal violation is a felony, with a maximum jail term of three years
and a $100,000 fine for individuals and $1,000,000 for corporations.1 3 Originally, the Sherman Act was read literally to include
every restraint of trade regardless of its reasonableness. The U.S.
Supreme Court altered this approach in 1911 when it adopted the
"rule of reason," holding that only unreasonable restraints of trade
fall within the prohibition of this language.3 It was the Court's
purpose to permit judicial interpretation to determine whether, on a
case by case basis, a particular restraint of trade was unreasonable.
The "rule of reason" has been followed by New Mexico courts.3 s
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court has modified the "rule of
reason" approach and delineated certain actions which are per se
violations of the Sherman Act. Thus, certain conduct, because of its
inherent anti-competitive nature, is illegal regardless of its purpose or
harm, and the introduction of evidence of the reasonableness of the
conduct is precluded. Per se violations reach both horizontal and
vertical arrangements. 3 6 Among competitors, agreements to raise,
depress, peg, stabilize, maintain or fix prices,3 7 or to allocate
markets or customers 3 8 are per se violations. In the vertical chain of
distribution, the per se rule prohibits the maintenance of a resale
price imposed by a supplier upon a distributor or retailer. 3 ' Tying
arrangements, which are the conditioning of the sale or lease of one
product on the sale or lease of another when the seller has sufficient
economic power in the tying product market to diminish competi31. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (1978).
32. Id Subjecting a person to imprisonment because of his inability to pay a fine has
been held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute invidious discrimination in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395
(1971).
33. Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
34. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
35. State v. Gurley, 25 N.M. 233, 252 P. 1000 (1919); Elephant Butte Alfalfa Ass'n v.
Rouault, 33 N.M. 136, 262 P. 185 (1926).
36. Horizontal arrangements are those between or among competitors on the same level
of the chain of distribution. Vertical arrangements include one or more levels of the chain of
distribution.
37. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
38. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
39. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1908).
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tion in the market of the other product, 4 0 are per se violations.
Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal which exclude a
competitor of one or more of the members of the combination from
the market are also considered to be violations per se. 4 1 The New
Mexico courts have not addressed the question of per se violations. 4 2
As clearly set forth in the New Mexico statute, the restraint of
trade need not be effected for a violation to occur.4 3 In order for a
violation to be found, some form of agreement is required, although
under federal case law it may be inferred. 4
Conscious parallel
activity, in addition to other evidence consistent with a conspiracy,
4
may be sufficient under federal law. 1
Another section of the New Mexico Restraint of Trade Statutes
declares the monopolization, or attempt, combination, or conspiracy
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce of New Mexico to
be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 and/or
imprisonment of up to one year. 4 6 Section 2 of the Sherman Act
proscribes the same conduct. 4 I Under federal decisions, the Supreme
Court has defined the offense of monopoly as (1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident. 4 8 Monopoly power is the power to
control process or exclude competition,4" and the relevant market
40. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). See
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) for limitations.
41. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 356 U.S. 207 (1959); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealer's Assn. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
42. An argument can be made that the language of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (1978)
declaring to be illegal contracts or combinations "having for its object or which shall operate
to restrict trade or commerce or control the quantity, price, or exchange of any article of
manufacture or product of the soil or mine" requires proof of the intent or operation of the
illegal contract or combination and precludes the existence of per se violations under the
statute. Such contention has not been raised in any reported decision in the New Mexico
courts.
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (1978) prohibits a contract or combination which has "for
its object" the restriction of trade or commerce. See W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Jones, 39 N.M.
381, 47 P.2d 906 (1935).
44. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Frey & Sons Inc.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
45. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1959); Theater Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
46. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-12 (1978).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) which condemns: "Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations ......
48. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
49. United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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includes both the geographic and product markets.' 0 "An intent to
bring about the forbidden act"' 1 is sufficient to uphold a monopolization charge while specific intent is required for the offense of an
attempt to monopolize. 5 2
The New Mexico law provides that any contracts or agreements in
violation of the foregoing two sections shall be void.5 ' A similar
provision is not set forth in the federal law. The New Mexico statute
further provides, through a 1907 amendment, for civil redress for
actual damages.5 4 By amendment adopted in 1923, New Mexico
allows the agricultural or horticultural organizations, and the labor
of a human being exceptions found in the Clayton Act.5 s

THE USE OF THE PRESENT RESTRAINT OF TRADE STATUTES
Private Cases
Reported decisions indicate that the New Mexico restraint of trade
statutes have not been used frequently and reflect the difficulty of
the private litigant to achieve recourse. The statutes have most often
been invoked by defendants to void restrictive covenants against
5 7
or in
competition as in leases,' 6 in employment contracts,
5 9
5
contracts. In these situations claims have
supply ' or franchise
been made that the restrictive covenants are void under Section
49-1-3 for being in restraint of trade Linder Section 49-1-1. The
genesis for these cases had been in the common law rule that restrictive covenants would be held void as against public policy unless the
covenant was merely ancillary to the main purpose of the contract
and was necessary to protect one of the parties from injury in the
execution of the contract or the enjoyment of its fruits.6 0 The New
Mexico Supreme Court in Winrock Enterprises recently followed this
50. Id.
51. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,432 (2d Cir. 1945).
52. Id.; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
53. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3 (1978).
54. Id.
55. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-4 (1978).
56. Winrock Enterprises, Inc. v. House of Fabrics of New Mexico, 91 N.M. 661, 579 P.2d
78.7 (1978); Gonzalez v. Reynolds, 34 N.M. 35, 275 P. 922 (1929).
57. Nichols v. Anderson, 43 N.M. 296, 92 P.2d 781 (1939); see also Excelsior Laundry
Co. v. Drehl, 32 N.M. 169, 252 P.2d 991 (1927) in which competitive activity was enjoined
in absence of a contractual provision prohibiting it.
58. Thomas v. Garvin, 15 N.M. 660, 110 P.2d 841 (1910).
59. Yarborough v. Harkey, 67 N.M. 204, 354 P.2d 137 (1960).
60. Gross-Kelly & Co. v. Bibo, 19 N.M. 495, 145 P. 480 (1914). The common law
position was adopted to avoid one deprived of his livelihood from becoming a public charge.
139 (1974).
Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, 2 Ed.
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rule.6 1 In all but one case, 6 2 the contractual provision has been
upheld.
Other uses of the statutes by private litigants have been sporadic
and equally unsatisfying to those raising antitrust claims. The New
Mexico Supreme Court rejected an antitrust claim of a distributor,
being sued by the manufacturer on a contract, who alleged, inter alia,
that the contract contained illegal resale price maintenance provisions. 6 3 In another case, the Supreme Court upheld the exemption
6
of a cooperative marketing association from antitrust prohibitions. 1
A third case involved a suit by a materialman against a contractor in
which the contractor claimed that a contract between him and a
third party was in restraint of trade. The claim was rejected by the
Supreme Court because of lack of standing.6 s The Court of Appeals
declined to rule on whether the requiring of membership in the
Albuquerque Board of Realtors for participation in its multiple
6
listing service created a combination tending to monopolize trade. 6
Violations of state law were also raised in a pendant claim in a case in
the U.S. District Court, District of New Mexico alleging price
discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act 6 7 and
conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The
state claim did not proceed to litigation.6 8
Recent cases concerning uranium contracts demonstrate the
potential of private state antitrust litigation. 6 9 In those cases, suppliers of uranium had entered into supply contracts and sought to
61. 91 N.M. 661, 579 P.2d 787 (1978).
62. Gross-Kelly & Co. v. Bibo, 19 N.M. 495, 145 P. 480 (1914). See also Gallup Elec.
Light Co. v. Pac. Improvement Co., 16 N.M. 86, 113 P. 848 (1911), in which the Supreme
Court upheld a contractual restraint attacked for violation of the Sherman Act.
63. W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Jones, 39 N.M. 381,47 P.2d 906 (1935).
64. Elephant Butte Alfalfa Assn. v. Rouault, 33 N.M. 136, 262 P. 185 (1926).
65. State ex rel. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Elec. City Supply Co., Inc., 74 N.M. 295, 393
P.2d 325 (1964).
66. Wilson v. Albuquerque Bd. of Realtors, 82 N.M. 717, 487 P.2d 145 (1971).
67. 15 U.S.C. § § 12(f), 13 (1976).
68. Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 252 F. Supp. 674 (1966). In another federal
case, Moore v. Mead Serv. Co., 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950), the tenth circuit found that
an agreement between the plaintiff bread manufacturer and local businesses not to purchase
the bread of defendant manufacturer constituted a restriction of competition in violation of
the New Mexico restraint of trade and federal antitrust laws. The judgment was vacated by
the United States Supreme Court because the plaintiff was denied recovery on the basis of
this activity. 340 U.S. 944 (1951). The complaint alleged violations of Sections 57-1-1
through 57-1-3 and violations of the Price Discrimination Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 57-14-9
(1978).
69. United Nuclear Corporation v. General Atomic Company, No. 50827, (N.M. Dist.
Ct., Santa Fe Cty. filed Dec. 21, 1975); General Atomic Co. v. Ranchers Exploration & Dev.
Corp., No. 2-76-00598 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Bern. Cty. filed Feb. 10, 1976); Reserve Oil &
Mineral Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., No. 77-592C (D. N.M. filed Sept. 22, 1977).
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have the contracts declared void under Section 49-1-3.7 0 The United
Nuclear case is illustrative. In that case United Nuclear Corporation,
which had entered into contracts with Gulf Oil Company, claimed
(1) that the contracts violated Section 49-1-1 because Gulf controlled production and precluded United Nuclear's product from
competing with the production of others with whom Gulf had joined
in a cartel; (2) that the contracts were part of an illegal attempt to
monopolize under Section 49-1-2 in that Gulf had taken predatory
acts against competitors and attempted to eliminate competition in
New Mexico; (3) that Gulf conspired with others to monopolize New
Mexico uranium in violation of Section 49-1-2; and (4) that Gulf
illegally monopolized the New Mexico uranium market in violation
of Section 49-1-2 by virtue of its ownership and control of uranium
reserves in New Mexico and its monopoly power in other markets
which gave it the power to fix the price of New Mexico uranium and
to exclude competition from the New Mexico market. The claims of
the other uranium supplier litigants are similar, but include, in addition, a prayer for damages under Section 49-1-3. None of these
claims have been litigated, although defendant's motion for summary
judgment in the United Nuclear case was denied. 7 '
Public Enforcement
The paucity of cases under the New Mexico Restraint of Trade
Statutes is not limited to private litigation. Only one case of public
enforcement has been reported under the statutes since their enactment. 72 The case was, by necessity, a criminal action as the State
does not have civil enforcement powers under the law. 7 3 The pros70. As section 57-1-3 does not provide for treble damages as available to federal litigants,
the ability to have a contract declared void is the most effective tool provided by New
Mexico law.
71. In United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., No. 50827 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Santa Fe
Cty. filed Dec. 21, 1975), plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment and other sanctions
under Rule 37 of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure was granted for failure to
comply with the trial court's discovery orders. The judgment is presently on appeal to the
New Mexico Supreme Court. A settlement has been reached in General Atomic Co. v.
Ranchers Exploration and Dev. Corp. No. 2-76-00598 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Bern. Cty. filed Feb.
10, 1976). See also Homestake Mining Co. v. Enerdyne, No. 77-609M (D. N.M., filed Sept.
29, 1977), an action for declaratory judgment under a uranium development agreement in
which the defendant counterclaimed for damages alleging the plaintiff had used the agreement to withhold and delay the production of uranium in violation of the New Mexico
restraint of trade statutes and the federal antitrust laws. The plaintiff has filed a motion
with the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation to transfer the counterclaim to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings in In
re Uranium Industry Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 342.
72. State v. Gurley, 25 N.M. 233, 252 P. 1000 (1919).
73. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 57-1-1 to 4 (1978).
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ecution was unsuccessful in that case as the Supreme Court, applying
the "rule of reason," found that an agreement to control all the
broom corn produced in Curry County in 1917 did not fall within
the restraint of trade statutes.
In view of the inability of federal authorities to pursue localized
antitrust violations, 7 4 the consequence of the failure of the State to
engage in public enforcement is that violations "go undetected and
dollars ...
. . . illegally gained
7

remain unrecovered from the purses of

the violators." 5
The reasons for inactive state antitrust enforcement have been the
subject of frequent comment. Professor Rubin notes the importance
of lack of legislative appropriations and attorney general interest as
well as "such factors as inefficient or nonexistent investigative
procedures, the lack of trained full-time personnel, cumbersome
and often unworkable remedies and sanctions, antiquated laws and
procedures, the apprehension in many state capitols that vigorous
enforcement will drive industry from the state, and the forceful
opposition of business and their attorneys to meaningful state
reform., 7 6 Presently in New Mexico, neither a lack of funding or
stafr7 7 nor a lack of attorney general interest 7 ' are impediments to
active enforcement. The remaining factors discussed by Professor
Rubin point to the deficiencies of the New Mexico laws in accomplishing effective enforcement in the modern society of commerce
and industry. The activity in sister states and the number of complaints from businessmen and consumers received by the Office of
is
the Attorney General indicate that the lack of cases in New Mexico
79
not caused by the absence of antitrust violations in the State.
In the 1970's, the citizens of Arizona have learned the significance
of antitrust enforcement by state authorities. In 1974, prior to the
enactment of the Uniform State Antitrust Act by Arizona, the State
brought cases alleging Sherman Act violations in the Arizona
74. See note 23 and accompanying test, supra.
75. Testimony of John H. Shenefield, supra note 23.
76. Rubin, supra note 21, at 697-98. See also National Association of Attorneys General,
State Antitrust Laws and Their Enforcement 2 (1974).
77. The Office of the Attorney General received a grant of $230,503 for federal fiscal
year 1978 from the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, supra, Note 8, to establish an Antitrust Unit.
78. Both Attorney General Jeff Bingaman and former Attorney General Toney Anaya,
have publicly expressed their interest in antitrust enforcement. See Santa Fe New Mexican,
Oct. 16, 1978, at 10 and Albuquerque Journal, Dec. 22, 1977, at G5.
79. In the eleven months since establishing its Antitrust Unit, the Office of the Attorney
General has opened thirty-three files involving potential antitrust violations within New
Mexico.
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bakery8 ° and dairy product industries. 8' As a result of a consent
decree, $2,330,000.00 was distributed to over 250,000 households
which purchased bakery products. At least $4,000,000 will be distributed to purchasers of dairy products, and the
State has received
82
approximately 345,000 claims from consumers.
The Arizona Uniform State Antitrust Act 8" became effective in
August 1974, and since its enactment eleven cases have been filed by
the Attorney General.8 4 The focus of these cases has been alleged
price fixing in industries providing a variety of goods and services,
including suppliers of school districts,8 s mortuaries, 8 6 retail liquor
dealers,8 7 garbage collectors, 8 automobile towers, 8 9 cement and
ready-mix suppliers, 9 0 veterinarians,9 1 and insurance agents. 9 2 In
addition, a pendant claim under the Act was alleged by the State in a
federal action seeking an injunction and declaratory relief against the
use of relative value and fee schedules by doctors. 9 3 Consent decrees
providing for an injunction have been entered in four cases and
damages and/or civil penalties have been obtained resulting in a recovery to the State of $141,125.00. 9 ' In addition to state enforce80. State of Arizona v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-330 PHX-CAM (D.
Ariz., filed May 8, 1974).
81. State of Arizona v. Borden, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-594 PHX-CAM (D. Ariz., filed
August 28, 1974).
82. Interview with Kenneth R. Reed, Director, Antitrust Section, Economic Protection
Division, Office of the Attorney General, State of Arizona, July 26, 1978.
83. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § § 44-1401 to 44-1413 (1974).
84. Interview with Kenneth R. Reed, supra note 82. One case, Arizona Trust Co. v.
Arizona, No. 2330 State of Arizona Dept. of Ins. (Mar. 4, 1977) was litigated before the
Arizona Department of Insurance after the insurance agents, who were the subject of an
investigation by the state, petitioned the department to enjoin the state from commencing
any action against them.
85. State of Arizona ex rel. Babbitt v. Marston's, Inc., No. C 337771 (Ariz. Super. Ct.,
Mari Cty., Aug. 24, 1976).
86. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Abbey Funeral Chapel, Inc., No. C 15692 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., Pima Cty., Sept. 25, 1975).
87. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Arizona Licensed Beverage Assoc., Inc., No. C
324225 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Mari. Cty., Dec. 3, 1975).
88. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Universal Waste Control, No. C 336221 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., MarL Cty., July 21, 1976).
89. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Central Arizona Towing Association, No. C
322380 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Mar. Cty., Oct. 29, 1975).
90. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Arizona Portland Cement Co., C 339216 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., Mar. Cty., Sept. 23, 1976).
91. State of Arizona ex reL Babbitt v. Arizona Veterinary Medical Ass'n, Inc., No. C
334115 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Mari. Cty., June 9, 1976).
92. Arizona Trust Co. v. Arizona, No. 2330 State of Arizona Dept. of Ins. (March 4,
1977).
93. State of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, Civ. Action No. 78-800 PHX
(D. Ariz. 1978).
94. Interview with Kenneth R. Reed, supra note 82.
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ment, the Arizona Act has encouraged private litigation, permitting
one case for which an exemption from the federal law would arguably have precluded suit. 9 I
In Colorado, the antitrust statute 9 6 was enacted in 1957. It also
was patterned after the Sherman Act and provides both criminal and
9
civil penalties for violations, 7 and, importantly, injunctive powers
not available under the New-Mexico statutes. It does not contain a
private civil remedy. Since 1975, the Colorado Attorney General has
successfully used the statute in obtaining consent decrees for injunctive relief against retail price maintenance agreements between
9
retailers and manufacturers or distrubutors of ski bindings, ' alco9
holic beverages, " and bedding products. oo Injunctive relief was
also obtained in cases against two professional groups, certified shorthand reporters1 0 1 and land surveyors.' 02 These two injunctions
prohibited the use of minimum fee schedules or professional codes of
ethics to maintain or fix prices. In addition, criminal enforcement in
Colorado has resulted in the imposition of fines in cases brought by
the Antitrust Section in the amount of $237,000.00 in three
cases. 10 3
The use of the injunctive powers by the Attorneys General of
Arizona and Colorado illustrate the beneficial effect on the market
place of such powers. In Arizona, prior to the State's action in the
mortuaries case, the lowest priced funeral offered Arizona consumers
was approximately $250.00, and mortuaries did not advertise prices.
95. Sterman v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 119 Ariz. 268, 580 P.2d 729 (Ct. App.
1978).
96. The Restraint of Trade and Commerce Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-4-101 to 109
(1973).
97. Criminal violations are misdemeanors, carrying a fine of not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000 for individuals and/or imprisonment of up to one year. A business entity
is subject to the same fine for a first offense and a maximum of $10,000 for subsequent
offenses. (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-4-107 (1973).
98. State of Colorado v. Salomon/North America, Inc., Civil Action No. C-60727 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., Denver, Colo., Dec. 18, 1975).
99. State of Colorado v. James G. Beam Distilling Co., [1976] 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
60,920 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver).
100. State of Colorado v. Simmons Co., Civil Action No. C-61646 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Colo., Jan. 30, 1976).
101. State of Colorado v. Colorado Certified Shorthand Reporters, Civil Action No.
C-11397 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver, Colo., Jan. 5, 1976).
102. State of Colorado v. Professional Land Surveyors of Colorado, Civil Action No.
C-48514 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver, Colo., Jan. 5, 1976).
103. Although the thrust of the antitrust enforcement in Arizona and Colorado has been
civil, other states have concentrated on criminal enforcement. Wisconsin, upon whose
statute the Colorado statute is based, successfully prosecuted thirty (30) individuals and
ninety-four (94) business entities since 1972. These prosecutions resulted in $470,600 fines
as well as jail sentences.

Winter 1978-79]

NEW MEXICO RESTRAINTOF TRADESTATUTES

As a result of the order of the court, lowest funeral prices dropped to
approximately $150.00 and the citizens of Arizona have benefitted
by the advertising of the price of mortuarial services.' 04 In Colorado, before the court order prohibiting the setting of uniform prices
for depositions and other services in the shorthand reporter's case,
shorthand reporters were charging $2.15 to the Office of the Attorney General per page of typed manuscript in addition to an
appearance fee of $60.00. After the order was entered, the price per
page was reduced to $1.25, and no appearance fee was charged." s
PROPOSAL FOR ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

The importance of competition to the businessman and consumer
in New Mexico's developing economy requires effective laws against
anti-competitive practices. Legislation to enact provisions which have
proven to be effective in other states and on the federal level will be
introduced in the 1979 legislative session. Such legislation need not
substantially amend the substantive provisions of the existing law in
order to make them conform to federal violations.' 06 It should
particularly focus on remedying the inadequacies in the procedural
and relief provisions in the present law to facilitate public enforcement and encourage private actions. Recommended provisions
granting the State civil remedies, allowing for pre-complaint investigation by the State, strengthening criminal sanctions, incorporating
federal decisions, and facilitating private remedies are discussed
below.
State Civil Remedies
The present restraint of trade statutes do not make provision for
civil penalties or injunctive relief at the request of the State. Therefore, when the State discovers an ongoing antitrust violation, its only
remedy is to prosecute criminally. The result is that the anti-competitive practice continues at the expense of the public, and, in many
instances, an injured businessman until a criminal prosecution occurs.
Further, some types of anti-competitive activity, particularly tie-in
arrangements or non-per se violations absent specific evidence of
104. Interview with Kenneth R. Reed, supra note 82.
105. Interview with Robert F. Hill, former First Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Colorado Office of Attorney General, Antitrust Division, August 16, 1978.
106. The exceptions being the inclusion of "conspiracy" within N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 49-1-1 to conform with the prohibitions of The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976) and the removal of the language which can be construed to include per se violations.
See note 42 supra.
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willfullness, are typically not prosecuted as criminal violations,' 0 7
and in such cases, the activity, unless proceeded upon civilly, may
continue indefinitely.
Civil enforcement, therefore, is a substantial tool in the State's
enforcement capabilities. Injunctive relief is available to thirty-five
states.' o8 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Law recognized the significance of state civil remedies, and included
in the Uniform State Antitrust Act the power for the State not only
to seek an injunction,' 9 but also a civil penalty of no more than
$50,000 for each violation' ° and the right to seek damages.' I
Such authority would be appropriate in New Mexico. Under the
present law, a maximum fine of $1,000 can be viewed as insignificant
and absorbed as a cost of doing business if caught. The increase in
civil penalties is designed to help maintain a competitive marketplace' 11 2 by acting as a deterrent to potential violators. As has been
107. Remarks of Donald I. Baker, former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, before the Antitrust Law Briefing Conference, February 28,
1977.
108. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
109. [19741 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 30,101, § 8.
30,101, § 7. Presently twenty-seven states have the
110. [1974] 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
power to seek civil penalties of money or property: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. In addition,
under the statutes of twenty-seven states, the right to do business of corporations engaged in
antitrust violations is subject to forfeiture: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
30,101, § 8. Provisions specifically enabling the state
111. [19741 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
to bring an action for damages incurred by the state or political subdivisions have been
enacted in twenty-five states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia. Further, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Nevada and West Virginia have the authority to recover damages as parens patriae of the
residents of the state who have sustained damages, and Kentucky has the right to obtain
restitution for its citizens. Such provisions are comparable to the authority recently granted
to the states by Congress enabling the States' Attorneys General to maintain actions under
the federal antitrust laws on behalf of the natural residents of their states. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)
(1976).
112. "Civil penalties are effective only if the amounts involved are large enough to be of
some significance to the violator. With the decrease in the value of the dollar and the
increase in corporate profits, several states have recently increased or attempted to increase
antitrust penalties while some states with new antitrust laws have set higher maximum fines
than most older laws." National Association of Attorneys General, note 76 supra, at 26.
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the experience in Colorado, appropriate cases could be concluded
1
with the use of a consent judgment. 3
Civil Investigative Demand
The most significant procedural amendment necessary is the addition of pre-complaint investigatory powers, some form of which are
presently available in twenty-seven other states.' 1 4 The purpose of
this authority is to permit the Attorney General to fully investigate
any complaints and properly evaluate the impact upon the public
and businesses involved before any action is filed. The need of such
authority has been expressed by the Chief of the U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division:
I think it is widely recognized that no field of litigation involves
facts that are more complex than those found in antitrust cases...
What on the surface may seem like a clear cut civil antitrust violation
may, after a thorough investigation, turn out to be of no antitrust
significance. Only an adequate investigation can provide the facts
that are necessary for an informed prosecutorial judgment.' 15
Absent such authority, civil enforcement by the State is substantially weakened. Alternative methods of developing information
civilly are inadequate. These include: (1) relying on the voluntary
cooperation of the party under investigation or third parties such as
competitors, suppliers, or customers, all of whom have traditionally
refused to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice and whose
statements, not under oath, are of limited value, and (2) filing an
action and relying upon broad discovery, a procedure which "is often
113. Interview with Robert F. Hill, supra note 105.
114. Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia. In addition, Kansas, Louisiana, Texas, and
Wisconsin have pre-filing investigatory authority upon application to the court.
115. Testimony of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division before the Judiciary Committee of the Ohio Senate, September
20, 1977, at 2. Tom Kauper, former Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, in charge of the Antitrust Division, has stated with respect to precomplaint investigation:
It is important to remember that the Department's objective at the pre-complaint stage of the investigation is not to "prove" its case but rather to make
an informed decision on whether or not to file a complaint. In over 80% of
our investigations in which CIDs are issued, we ultimately decide not to file a
case. There can be no doubt that this is preferable to filing complaints based
upon sketchy or inaccurrate (sic) information.
Id. at 4.
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1
wasteful... and universally condemned."' 6 The result of not having
of crimpre-complaint investigatory powers will be a predominance
11 7
inal proceedings through grand jury investigations.
Under the Uniform State Antitrust Act, upon reasonable cause to
be believed that a violation of the Act has occurred and a person or
business entity has relevant information, the person or entity may be

required to answer questions under oath or produce documents for

inspection.' 18 Such authority is not new to New Mexico officials as
the Attorney General already has the authority to issue a civil investigatory demand (CID) for documents prior to filing an action
under the Unfair Practices Act.' 19 Additionally, the Commissioner
of Banking' 20 and the Director of the Securities Division' 2 ' have
the authority, by use of subpoena, to obtain documents, oral testimony, and answers to interrogatories.
Such pre-complaint authority also parallels that of the U.S.
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division as recently expanded by
This Division was originally granted pre-complaint
Congress."'2
investigating powers in 1962,1 2 ' and civil investigative demands
were limited to the obtaining of documentary evidence as under the
New Mexico Unfair Practices Act. 1 2 ' The experience of the Anti-

trust Division, however, indicated that oral testimony or answers to
interrogatories were, in certain circumstances, the only means of

ascertaining relevant facts to determine whether an antitrust viola116. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1343, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1976). See also, Siegel, The Antitrust Civil Process Act: The Attorney-General's Pre-Action Key to Company Files, Vill. L.
Rev. 413, 416 (1965); The Report of Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, 344-345 (1955). See also In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D.
Minn. 1963), aff'd per curiam 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964); Hyster Co. v. United States,
338 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1964).
117. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) in which
Justice Douglas stated that the prosecution's "using criminal procedures to elicit evidence in
a civil case ... would be flouting the policy of the law." Such practice has been further
criticized for it "debases the law by tarring respectable citizens with the brush of crime
when their deeds involve no criminality." Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 342 (1955).
118. [19741 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 30,101, § 6(a).
119. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-12 (1978).
120. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-1-34 (1978).
121. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13-36 (1978).
122. 15 U.S.C. § § 1311 to 1314 (1976).
123. The Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, 76 Stat. 548 (1962). The
use of CID authority has been held not to be an unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. In re Gold Bond Stamps Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd
per curiam 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964); Hyster Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 183 (9th
Cir. 1964).
124. The Antitrust Civil Process Act of 1962 also restricted the issuance of CIDs to
non-natural persons. This limitation was removed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
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tion had taken place' 25 and, as a result, Congress granted such
power.' 26
Safeguards to protect business from potential abuse are essential
to the granting of such governmental power. Any information obtained pursuant to a CID must be kept confidential until an action
has been filed.'

27

A similar provision in the Unfair Practices Act' 2 I

has been successful in preventing disclosure of business information.
Under an antitrust statute the demand must contain a description of
the nature of the conduct under investigation,' 2 9 and there must be
the right to counsel at any stage, in preparing responses, answering
written interrogatories, and testifying under oath.' 30 Questions of
self-incrimination can be avoided and compliance encouraged with a
provision comparable to that formerly present in the Securities Act
of New Mexico" 1 prohibiting the use of information obtained by
the demand for criminal prosecution. By the federal courts' inter125. Testimony of John H. Shenefield, supra, note 115.
126. 15 U.$.C. § § 1311-1314 (1976). In the first fourteen months that the Antitrust
Division had the expanded authority, 187 CIDs were issued for documents, 23 for absences
to written interrogatories, and 22 for oral testimony. Testimony of John H. Shenefield,
supra, note 115.
127. See Uniform State Antitrust Act, [1974] 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 30,101, § 6(c) and
Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(f) (1976).
128. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-12F (1978).
129. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. 1312(b)(1)(A) (1976) and the Uniform
State Antitrust Act, [1974] 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
30,101, § 6(a)(2) have such
provisions. See In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per
curiam 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964); Lightning Rod Mfg. Assn. v. Stoal, 339 F.2d 346
(7th Cir. 1964).
130. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1312(i)(7)(A) (1976)
provides: Any
person compelled to appear under
a demand f3r oral testimony
pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the
request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to any
question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on the
record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for the
record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be made,
received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such person is
entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any constitutional or
other legal right or privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination.
Such person shall not otherwise object to or refuse to answer any question,
and shall not by himself or through counsel otherwise interrupt the oral
examination. If such person refuses to answer any question, the antitrust
investigator conducting the examination may petition the district court of the
United States pursuant to section 1314 of this title for an order compelling
such person to answer such question.
131. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13-36 (1978). Prior to 1971 the Securities Act of New
Mexico prevented one from failing to comply with a subpoena on the grounds that the
evidence or testimony would be incriminating or would subject one to a penalty or forfeiture. The Act gave immunity from prosecution, penalty or forfeiture to a person for any
matter on which testimony or evidence was compelled after a claim of privilege was made.
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pretation of the Antitrust Division's powers, a CID must be issued in
good faith 1 3 2 and must be relevant.' 33 It may not be too indefinite, 1 3 and cannot be used for purposes of harrassment or to
place under duress,1 3 5 or for a fishing expedition.' 36 Documents in
the possession of a private antitrust plaintiff received during litigation are denied access.' 37
Furthermore, legislation must include procedures to enable the
person to whom the civil investigative demand is directed to formally
contest an objection. Under the Uniform Act, when there is objection, the recipient may refuse to comply with the demand, requiring
the Attorney General to petition the court to enforce the demand.' 38 To order compliance, the court must find that the demand
is proper and there is reasonable cause to believe that there has been
a violation and that the information or document sought is relevant
to the violation.1I9 The court may further modify the demand to
protect the person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, burden or expense.1 40
Criminal Remedies

The existing restraint of trade statutes reflect the legislative intent
that violations of antitrust laws should be treated as criminal con-

duct. The value of such treatment is that criminal sanctions act as a
deterrence based upon the impact of the threat of a jail term to
businessmen and of the stigma of being considered a criminal. 41
132. In re Emprise Corporation, 344 F. Supp. 319 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Cleveland
73,991 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
Trust Co. [1972] Trade Cases (CCH)
133. Material Handling Institute, Inc. v. McLaren, 426 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1970).
134. In re Gold Bond Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), aff'd per curiam
325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
135. Chattanooga Pharmaceutical Assn. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 358 F.2d 864
(6th Cir. 1966); American Pharmaceutical Assn. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 344 F.
Supp. 9 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
136. In re Gold Stamp Co., 221 F. Supp. 391 (D. Minn. 1963), affd per curiam 325
F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
62,015 (S.D.N.Y.
137. United States v. G.A.F. Corp., [1978-1] Trade Cases (CCH)
1978).
30,101, § 6b.
138. [1974] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
139. Id
71,830
140. Id See Upjohn Company v. Bernstein, [1966] Trade Cases (CCH)
(D.D.C. 1966).
141. The subject of the type of criminal sanctions which are appropriate for antitrust
violations has been the subject of much debate. See National Association of Attorneys
General, note 76, supra; J. Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal Antitrust
Laws, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1967). See Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1964) for positions supporting jail terms for deterrent purposes, and Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties
and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic Analysis, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1973) for an
argument supporting increased fines.
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Such sanctions are sought by the U.S. Department of Justice only for
willful violations, most commonly price fixing and market allocation,'
and Congress has recently increased the penalties so that a
violation will constitute a felony."' On the state level, as one writer
has observed, the deterrence can be even more effective as local
violations are usually clear-cut per se violations by small businesses.1 4 4 Currently antitrust violators are subject to criminal sanctions in thirty-seven states. 141
The present law creates only a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
of no more than $1,000 and no less than $100.' 46 A recent Colorado case' 4 7 demonstrates the lack of impact of such a penalty.
Violations of the Colorado statutes are punishable as a misdemeanor
carrying a maximum fine of $5,000 without a potential jail term.
The defendants, charged with the fixing of prices, requested to
change their plea from not guilt to nolo contendere, agreeing to pay
the maximum fine. The judge, expressing his concern about the
statutory limitations placed upon him, observed on permitting the
change of plea:
I am willing to state publicly here now that I think that, in view of
what we know of the use of corporate power in this country... the
State Legislature should do just as the Congress has done and make
this the kind of a crime that the people contend that it is and make
14
the punishment fit the crime. 8
The New Mexico Legislature, in updating the penalties it established
in 1891, should be guided by the experience in antitrust prosecutions
in federal courts and in sister states such as Colorado, and establish a
fourth degree felony for antitrust violations to create an effective
deterrent to illegal activity.
142. Remarks of Donald I. Baker, supra note 107.
143. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
144. Flynn, supra, note 141.
145. Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
146. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (1978).
147. People v. Elder-Quinn & McGiU, Inc., Crim. Action No. CR-8598 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Denver, Colo., Nov. 10, 1977).
148. Opinion of the Honorable Edward C. Day, retired Supreme Court Justice, Acting
District Court Judge. In another Colorado case in which the defendants were charged with
price fixing, the Honorable J. E. DeVilbiss, District Judge, remarked: "The strictures placed
upon this Court in assessing punishment in a case of this type necessarily diminish the
Court's ability to adequately express the odiousness of this sort of behavior." People v.
Valley Petroleum Co., Crim. Action No. 2902 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Glenwood Springs, Colo.,
Nov. 23, 1977).
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Constructionwith FederalLaws
Because there have been only infrequent appellate decisions in the
almost ninety years since the enactment of the restraint of trade
statutes, a comprehensive interpretation by the courts has not
occurred. As a result, substantial areas of antitrust law which have
been developed in the federal courts have not been raised in New
Mexico courts.1 49 Yet the New Mexico Supreme Court has generally
followed interpretations of the federal law.1 s 0 As proposed legislation should be similar in many respects to the federal statutes, it
should provide that the New Mexico restraint of trade statutes shall
be construed in harmony with judicial interpretations of comparable
federal statutes.' 1 1
PrivateRemedies
Private litigation under the antitrust laws plays an important role
in the enforcement of antitrust violations. It supplements public
enforcement, "increases the likelihood that a violator will be found
out, greatly enlarges his penalties, and thereby helps discourage
illegal conduct." I 2
The present law permits an injured party to seek to void illegal
contracts and agreements and to recover damages occasioned by
violations in restraint of trade.' s' The voiding of illegal contracts is
not reflected in the federal statutes nor found in the Uniform Act. It
is, however, an effective remedy which should not be prevented by
proposed legislation. With respect to the damage provision, the
Uniform Act expands upon it by adopting the language on standing
of the Clayton Act, granting the right to sue to any person threatened with injury or injured in his business or property and by
specifically permitting injunctive relief as well as costs and attorneys'
149. An important example is the rule of per se violations long-recognized in the federal
courts. See text accompanying notes 36 to 41 supra.
150. See W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Jones, 39 N.M. 381,47 P.2d 906 (1935); State v. Gurley,
25 N.M. 233, 180 P. 288 (1919).
151. Similar provisions have been enacted in thirteen states: Arizona, Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
152. Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law-An Analysis Antitrust Principles and Their
Application, Vol. II, § 311(a). Damages are available to private litigants in thirty-eight
states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. In addition, the right to damages has been
implied under the Texas statute. N. Texas Gin Co. v. Thomas, 277 S.W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
153. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-3 (1978).
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fees.' ' ' In addition, it permits recovery of treble damages if the trier
of fact finds that the violation is flagrant.' ' ' For failing to permit
treble damages in all private cases as under the Clayton Act' I 6 and

twenty-one state statutes,' 5 7 the Uniform Act has been attacked for

allowing forum shopping and diluting the deterrent effect of private
actions.' 's As the most eggregious violations are the per se viola-

tions which are the focus of state enforcement, an alternative provi-

sion would provide that such violations are "flagrant" unless the trier
of fact found otherwise.
Private litigation should be encouraged by state law in a manner
paralleling Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act' ' 9 and the law of eighteen states' 6 0 which facilitates proof in a private action following a
final judgment or decree in an action brought by the U.S. Government. It provides that a final judgment or decree in a civil or criminal
proceeding that a person has violated the antitrust laws in an action
brought by or on behalf of the United States Government is prima
154. [1974] 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
30,101, § 8(b). As a result of the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), indirect purchasers may
not maintain damage actions under the Clayton Act when they have paid overcharges
resulting from antitrust violations. Legislation to permit recovery by such purchasers was
defeated in the 95th Congress. As a method of encouraging private enforcement of antitrust
violations within the State, consideration should be given by the New Mexico Legislature to
permit actions by indirect purchasers who have suffered injury by virtue of violation of the
antitrust laws.
155. [1974] 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
30,101, § 8(b). Similar provisions have been adopted
by Arizona, New Hampshire (if willful or flagrant) and Virginia. The language of the Uniform State Antitrust Act was recently upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court against a
constitutional challenge for vagueness. Western Waste Service Systems, Inc. v. Superior
Court of the State of Arizona for the County of Maricopa, No. 13717 (Super. Ct., Marl.
Cty., filed Sept. 8, 1978).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
157. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon,
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. In addition, the Michigan and
Ohio laws provide double damages, as does the Iowa statute in the discretion of the court.
158. The National Association of Attorneys General has taken the position, with respect
to the treble damages provision, that:
state law should be identical with federal if shopping for the most favorable
forum by a potential plaintiff is to be avoided ... Furthermore, it is often
stated that the treble damages provision of Section 4 of the Clayton Act is
meant to be an effective deterrent to potential violators of the antitrust laws.
Making actual damages the measure of recovery in a private antitrust action
can hardly be said to constitute an effective deterrent; the potential violator of
an antitrust law is not likely to be dissuaded by the prospect of paying back,
except in extraordinary cases, only what he made through his illegal activity.
National Association of Attorneys General, supra, note 76, at 24.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
160. Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
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facie evidence against such person in a private action brought under
the Act as to all matters with respect to which the judgment or
decree would be an estoppel between the parties to the action.
Defendants may produce evidence in rebuttal,' 6 1 and the provision
1
does not apply to a consent judgment or decree 62 or to a nolo
1
contendere plea to a criminal charge. 6 3 Private actions frequently
follow actions brought by the Justice Department. With the improvement of state laws and with the effect of such a provision, more
intrastate cases will be brought following enforcement actions by the
states. 1 6 ' The result will be an increased role of private enforcement
against antitrust violations.
CONCLUSION
The importance of antitrust laws is well recognized. According to
the U.S. Supreme Court:
Antitrust laws ... are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms. And a freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, be it the freedom to compete
165

So crucial are antitrust laws to the economy of the state that the
New Mexico Constitution mandates the enactment of laws "to 1pretrade." 66
vent trusts, monopolies and combinations in restraint of
Such competitive ideals can only be understood in the present economy when resources are becoming scarce, prices are rising, and inflation is consuming purchasing power.
To insure that the ideals of free competition are carried out, effective enforcement of antitrust violations, public and private, is re161.
162.
163.
wealth

Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951).
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
City of Burbank v. General EleCtric Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); CommonEdison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,

376 U.S. 939 (1964).

164. The following lawsuits were filed in Wisconsin state courts following prosecutions
by the State. City of Madison v. C. A. Hooper Co., Civ. Action No. 140428 (Wisc. Cir. Ct.
Dane Cty., Sept. 28, 1973) (recoveries to date of $72,000); City of Janesville v. Barry, Civ.
Action No. 16170 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. Rock Cty., Mar. 30, 1973) (recovery of $225,000); City of
Madison v. Burch Construction Co., Civ. Action No. 141-487 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Dane Cty., Jan.
17, 1974) (recovery of $121,000); City of Madison v. Construction Supply, Inc., Civ.
Action No. 142-107 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Dane Cty., Mar. 8, 1974) (recoveries of $200,000); and
City of Madison v. Janisch, Civ. Action No. 151-131 (Wisc. Cir. Ct., Dane Cty., Mar. 29,

1976).
165. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).

166. N.M. Const. Art IV, § 38.
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quired. The federal government cannot prosecute all violations, and
the State is "'ideally situated to protect the rights of the consumer,
the small businessmen, and the honest businessmen of any size.' 6 7
The New Mexico restraint of trade statutes, however, do not permit
such enforcement in the present complex economy. The preservation
of competition within New Mexico calls for legislation which would
help ensure businessmen the opportunity to operate their businesses
free of illegal restraints and the consumer the ability to purchase
goods and services at the most competitive price.
(Editor'sNote: During the 1979 New Mexico legislative session much of the
legislation proposed in this article was contained in H.B. 273 sponsored by
George Fettinger (D. Otero). At printing time the legislation is awaiting the
Governor's signature. In substance most of the proposals in this article are contained in this new Antitrust Act. In the next issue of the New Mexico Law
Review there will be an update of this article informing the readers of the nature
of this legislation.)

167. Remarks to the U.S. Senate of Senator Morgan, North Carolina, co-sponsor of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1976.

